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THE USE OF THE TRUTH COMMISSION IN
SOUTH AFRICA AS AN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION MECHANISM VERSUS THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS
Ziyad Motala*

FOREWORD

This article is based on a speech delivered as part of the
Frank E.A. Sander Lecture at the plenary session of the
American Bar Association's Section of Dispute Resolution
Meeting. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"),
created pursuant to the South African Constitution, has been
touted as an alternative model for the resolution of past
conflict in a society marked by deep divisions and conflict.
The epilogue to the Interim Constitution stated that the
adoption of the Constitution provides a foundation for South
Africans to transcend the divisions and strife of the past. It
called on South Africans to achieve reconciliation,
understanding and reparation, but not for vengeance and
retaliation. The epilogue further required that "amnesty
shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offenses
associated with political objectives and committed in the
course of the conflicts of the past."1 Pursuant to this
requirement, the Legislature of South Africa passed the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995
("Amnesty Act" or "the Act") to grant amnesty to persons who
have committed political acts in the past, and who make a full
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. This is a paper presented
as part of the Frank E.A. Sander Lecture at the plenary session of the American
Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution Meeting in New York City on
April 15, 2004.
1. REP. OF S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1994) National Unity and
Reconciliation,
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/1993/sacon93txt.html
(last
visited Sept. 10, 2005).
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disclosure of their past deeds. The Amnesty Act provides that
the Amnesty Committee shall grant amnesty to all persons
who comply with the provisions of the Act, namely that they
have committed a political offense during the prescribed
period, and have made a full disclosure. A person who has
been granted amnesty enjoys full immunity from all criminal
and civil actions.
This article asserts that the TRC, although it serves an
important purpose of providing a factual record, does not
constitute an adequate mechanism under principles of
international law for addressing serious human rights
violations. International law requires that victims of gross
human rights violations be provided an effective remedy
before a competent tribunal. Moreover, international law
requires that individuals who commit serious violations of
human rights-particularly war crimes and crimes against
humanity-are punished.
This obligation to punish for
serious violations of international law is a superior norm of
international law, which rises to the level ofjus cogens and
from which there can be no derogation. Apartheid has been
characterized as a grave breach under the definition of a war
crime under the Additional Protocol of the Geneva
Conventions.
Apartheid has also been consistently
proclaimed as a crime against humanity.
Under
international law, this means that victims of apartheid
should be accorded all the remedies that are accorded to
victims of a war crime and a crime against humanity. The
granting of amnesty to individuals engaged in war crimes and
crimes against humanity deprives the victims of their right to
an effective remedy. Apart from depriving the victim of gross
human rights violations of an effective remedy, the success of
the TRC is largely exaggerated because there has been no
sociological study to demonstrate that the mechanisms
created under the Amnesty Act, which bypass the normal
judicial structures, promote truth and reconciliation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is an honor and privilege to appear before the ABA
Section of Alternate Dispute Resolution. On April 14, 2004,
South Africa celebrated its third democratic elections and the
first ten years of its democracy. In these first ten years of
democracy, the new South Africa has generally demonstrated
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an adherence to human rights and has firmly placed itself in
the mainstream of democratic international practice.
However, the granting of amnesty for gross human rights
violations and its validation by the Constitutional Court of
South Africa constitute a notable exception.2 It is one thing
for political actors to make an argument that political,
economic, and sociological reasons prompted the adoption of
the Amnesty Act. It is entirely different to assert that the
Amnesty Act is consistent with international human rights
norms because it clearly is not.
Under current prevailing views of international human rights
norms, war crimes demand that their perpetrators be
punished. A war crime, or for that matter a crime against
humanity, is not a "common" criminal offense. Nor is a war
crime a "political offense." As such, where a person is alleged
to have committed a war crime, it would not comport with
norms of international law for that person to receive amnesty
simply by claiming that the crime was of a political nature.3
Because the South African TRC grants amnesty to those
accused of war crimes in exchange for simple truth-telling, it
violates fundamental principals of international law.

II. BACKGROUND
Before turning to the legal principles, it is important to
first consider the horrific nature of the crimes at issue and
how they, and similar acts, have been addressed in South
Africa and elsewhere. First of all, it is important to note that
the following crimes were committed by the South African
army and police, as well as by other elements of the apartheid
state.
The apartheid regime indirectly caused serious
destruction and death by aiding and abetting insurgent
movements in Mozambique and Angola in committing
indiscriminate attacks, killing and maiming civilian
populations, and destroying civilian property. The apartheid
regime also perpetrated widespread torture, arbitrary

2. See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South
Africa 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (SA), http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf (last visited Feb.
23, 2005).
3. See B.A. Wortley, Political Crime in English Law and in International
Law, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L 238-39 (1971).
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deprivation of life (sometimes through hit squads 4), and
inhumane treatment of the civilian population and members
of the former South African liberation movements. The
regime also engaged in conduct "unique" to apartheid (which
the international community has targeted), including
widespread discrimination, dislocation, denationalization,
torture, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and a host of
other gross violations of human rights.
Overall, much
indignity was perpetrated on the South African majority by
the crimes of the apartheid regime. In response, the postamble to the Act rightfully sought to achieve national unity
and reconciliation amongst the people of South Africa by the
creation of a truth commission.5 A truth commission set up
to investigate abuses of the past has served in many countries
the important purpose of fact-finding and correcting past
wrongs and injustices.' Recreating an accurate picture of the
horrific events prevents a distortion of history, and allows
society to learn from its past to prevent such a repetition of
abuses in the future.7 Many human rights lawyers observe
that full truth-telling accompanied by self- reflection is
necessary for national healing.8
The idea of providing amnesty for political offenses and
omissions, as is called for in the post-amble to the South
African Constitution, is a sound choice that one hopes all
South Africans would support. Granting amnesty for political

4. A "hit squad" is a squad or team of state-sanctioned paramilitary forces
organized for carrying out a political assassination. Reed Kramer, Apartheid
Leadership Linked to 'Hit Squad,' WASH. POST, June 12, 1997, available at
httpJ/allafrica.com/stories/200010250256.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
5. The Commission, in operation since April 1996, investigates apartheidera atrocities and seeks to place blame on specific individuals. Under its
mandate, it grants amnesty to those who confess their roles in full and can
prove that their actions served some political motive.
See Issues and
Controversies on File-War Crimes Tribunals, South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (on file with the Santa ClaraLaw Review). See also
REP.
OF
S.
AFR.
CONST.
(Constitution
Act,
1994)
ch.
2
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislationl1993/sacon93txt.html
(last
visited Sept. 10, 2005).
6. In addition to South Africa, truth commissions have been established in
Uganda, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Zimbabwe, The Philippines, Chile, Chad,
Germany, El Salvador, Rwanda, and Ethiopia. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen
Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597,
597 (1994).
7. Id. at 607.
8. See id.
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offenses is something that a state may legally do, and this
option has been pursued in numerous emerging democracies.
Conversely, there can be no amnesty granted for the violation
of non-derogable rights.9 A war crime or a crime against
humanity is not a "common" criminal offense, and someone
alleged to have committed war crimes cannot receive amnesty
by claiming that the crime was of a political nature." This
distinction can be seen in the amnesty laws of the former
German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Hungary, which
provide amnesty for political offenses but have excluded
amnesty for crimes against humanity."
Where amnesty has been granted for gross human rights
violations, or violations of other non-derogable rights, it has
been universally condemned by international tribunals. For
instance, in a 1992 decision, the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights, declared that the "application of the
Salvadoran amnesty decree constitutes a clear violation of the
obligation of the Salvadoran Government to investigate and
publish the violations of the rights of the Las Hojas victims."'2
The Inter-American Commission also declared that the
application of amnesty constitutes a grave violation of nonderogable guarantees. 3 The Commission went on to say
[t]he present Amnesty law, as applied in these cases, by
foreclosing the possibility of judicial relief in cases of
murder, inhumane treatment and absence of judicial
9. Non-derogable rights can be defined as:
The set of rights from which no derogation is possible, not even in times
of emergency .... It includes the right to life, the right not to be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, the right not to be held in slavery or servitude, the right
not to be imprisoned for failure to perform a contractual obligation, the
right not to be subject to retroactive penal measures, the right to
recognition as a person before the law, and the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.
Position Paper: Protecting Human Rights in Times of Emergency, Association
for the Prevention of Torture, at http://www.apt.chlpub/library/pphr.htm (last
visited Apr. 11, 2005) (copy on file with the Santa ClaraLaw Review).
10. See Wortley, supra note 3.
11. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 451, 495
(1990).
12. Masacre Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, Report No. 26/92 Inter83
(1993),
LV/II.83
doc.
14
at
Am.
C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser.
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/26-92-EL-SALVADOR.htm (last visited
May 14, 2005).
13. Id.
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guarantees, denies the fundamental nature of the most
basic human rights. It eliminates perhaps the single most
effective means of enforcing such rights, the trial and
punishment of offenders.14
Similarly, in the case of Uruguay, as part of the
transition to a new constitutional order, political parties
provided amnesty to perpetrators of all crimes.
The
Uruguayan government argued that the granting of amnesty
was within its sovereign prerogative and should be viewed in
the political context of reconciliation. 5 The argument raised
by Uruguay is the same as the conclusion the Constitutional
Court arrived at in the Amnesty Decision. 6 Both decided that
it is within the power of a particular nation's legislature to
override international law, and that the granting of
widespread amnesty must be viewed as a necessary means to
achieve reconciliation.
However, the Inter-American
Commission ruled that Uruguay had violated its
international law obligations by failing to protect the
inalienable right of its citizens to a fair trial.
The
Commission also ruled that the effect of the amnesty "was to
deny the victim or his rightful claimant the opportunity to
participate in the criminal proceedings, which is the
appropriate means to investigate the commission of the
crimes denounced, determine criminal liability and impose
punishment on those responsible, their accomplices and
accessories after the fact." 7
In the Honduran case of
Velasquez Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights recognized a duty existed on the part of the Honduran
government not only to investigate but also to prosecute those
reliably accused of disappearances. 8
Based on these
decisions, it is clear that granting amnesty to those accused of
human rights violations does not meet international law
14. Id.

15. Mendoza v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372,
10.373, 10.374 and 10.375, Report 29/92, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser. L/VII.83
doc. 14 at 154
(1993), http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/29-92URUGUAY.htm (last visited May 14, 2005).
16. Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South
Africa 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (SA), http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf (last visited Feb.
23, 2005).
17. Mendoza, 40.
18. Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
(Ser.
C)
No.4
(1988),
1
174-85,
http://wwwlumn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b11_12d.htm (last visited May 14, 2005).
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obligations.
III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN MODEL
There were political realities and a constellation of other
political factors that constrained the role players drawing up
the Constitution. The apartheid generals were the most
significant constraining force, and their influence on the
drafting of the Constitution cannot be overstated. 9 Political
and economic considerations also likely played a role in the
decision not to proceed down the path of endless prosecutions
and litigation.
As a result, the drafters of the Republic of South Africa
Constitution Act in the post-end bill ° provided that the
adoption of this Constitution provides a foundation for South
Africans to transcend the divisions and strife of the past. The
post-end bill goes on to provide that there is a need for
reconciliation, understanding and reparation, but not for
vengeance and retaliation.
In order to advance such
reconciliation and reconstruction, the post-end bill provides
that "amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions
and offences associated with political objectives committed in
the course of the conflicts of the past."2' Pursuant to this
clause, the South African legislature also created a Truth and
Reconciliations Commission under the terms of the Promotion
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.2"
A. The Issues Created by the TRC and the Act
Before discussing the applicable norms of international
law, let me comment first on the premise of the Act. The Act
is called the "Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation

19. Views of Dullah Omar, Architect of the TRC. Knowledge and Justice
After the Truth and ReconciliationCommission: A Discussion with Alex Boraine
and Kendall Thomas at Bard College, Apr. 24, 2000, at 3, at
http://www.bard.edu/hrp/resources (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) (on file with the
Santa ClaraLaw Review).
20. REP. OF S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1994) National Unity and
Reconciliation,
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/legislation/1993/sacon93txt.html
(last
visited Sept. 10, 2005). The last clause of the constitution does not have a
number.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Act."23 Whether or not the TRC in fact set the country on the
path of "unity and reconciliation" is an open question. One
hears the view that the truth-telling contributed to a kind of
healing and catharsis,24 but these claims are untested and
arguably exaggerated. There are no sociological studies that
document this catharsis or healing. The notion that if the
torturers or murderers come forward and state that they
tortured someone's relative, and killed him in a certain way,
that there will be some kind of healing is unsubstantiated.
No doubt, there were instances where individuals came
forward simply because they needed to know what happened
to their relatives or friends. There were also likely instances
where the victim's family came forward and said they needed
to know where the body of their relative was so that they
could provide a dignified burial. There were instances where
individuals derived some level of "satisfaction," and a feeling
that the TRC gave them significance by allowing them to tell
their stories. These were all very moving occasions. In this
context, the TRC contributed to the engendering of allegiance
to the new order in South Africa, and during a particularly
fragile period immediately after the first democratic elections.
But the simple fact that the truth may be known is only the
beginning of the story.
Some frame the choice as truth versus justice. On the
one hand, the work of the TRC in uncovering the truth in
many instances where the information would not ordinarily
have come out is important. In the AZAPO decision, the
Constitutional Court recognized the value of uncovering the
truth in ruling that, absent amnesty and the coming forward
of the perpetrators, the country and the world would never
have known who the perpetrators of those human rights
abuses were.25 But on the other hand, the international law
perspective places more importance on bringing the
perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice.
For example, in the Rodriguez case, the Inter-American
23. Id. at cl. 49.
24. Humanitarianism and Human Rights Seminar: Discussion with Alex
Boraine and Breyten Breytenbach at Bard College, Nov. 30, 1999, at 8, at
http://www.bard.edu/hrp/resources/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) (on file with the
Santa ClaraLaw Review) [hereinafter Boraine & Breytenbach].
25. See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South
Africa 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (SA),
17, http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005).
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Court of Human Rights emphasized, "[tihe duty to
investigate, like the duty to prevent, is not breached merely
because the investigation does not produce a satisfactory
result."26 Nevertheless, it noted, the duty to investigate must
be undertaken seriously.27 However, the Amnesty Act and the
approach of the South African Constitutional Court are not
within this mainstream view of democratic international law.
In South Africa, it is a matter of common knowledge
what crimes were committed under apartheid and, in many
cases, even who the perpetrator was. The reality of death
squads, torture squads, repression, dispossession, and other
grave human rights violations was something these citizens
experienced first hand. For these South Africans, there is
less value to the truth-telling than there is in holding the
perpetrators accountable. Like the Biko family and Mxenge
family demanded before the Constitutional Court in the
AZAPO case, some of the victims of apartheid seek redress
and reprimand.28
On the other hand, we hear many whites saying "we
never knew this happened under apartheid," and the
argument is made that it was important that those citizens
knew the truth. If we are to accept this view, that truth is as
important as justice, it would give credence to the notion that
the TRC contributed more to the education and benefit of the
whites than for the black majority. Under prevailing views of
international law, this is an unacceptable result.
B. The Actual Effect of the TRC and the Amnesty Act
In any event, the purported benefit of the truth-telling
must be weighed against the fact that relatively few
perpetrators have actually come forward and made sincere
apologies for their actions. Instead, those accused of war
crimes have simply gone through the motions and followed
the requirements of the Amnesty Act as a means to avoid any

26. Velasquez Rodriquez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
(Ser. C) No.4 (1988), $ 177, http://wwwlumn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b-11-12d.htm
(last visited May 14, 2005).
27. Id.
28. Biko and Mxenge, South African citizens and apartheid-crimes victims,
were among the applicants in the AZAPO case who sought to invalidate the
Amnesty Act in order to bring human rights violators to justice. See AZAPO, at
1015.
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criminal or civil liability. In this sense, some would argue
that the TRC did more for the perpetrators than for the
victims. For telling their story, even without an apology, the
perpetrators avoided any liability and were not required to
compensate the victims in any way.
For example, see the testimony of Gideon Nieuwoudt, an
apartheid agent and former security policeman, the
perpetrator showed no remorse as he recounted how he blew
up four black colleagues he believed were African National
Congress sympathizers.29 Remorse, or lack thereof, is not
even one of the factors that the TRC will ultimately consider
in deciding whether Mr. Nieuwoudt receives amnesty. As in
all such cases, the amnesty panel decides only whether the
perpetrator has made full disclosure and whether he acted
with a political motive. He or she is not even required to
make any restitution.
The irony of this situation is that the new South African
state, now ruled by Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and
others, is expected to take reparation measures and address
the consequences of these very same human rights abuses.
On the other hand, in the AZAPO case, the Constitutional
Court recognized that the state could not compensate every
In light of this conclusion, the
victim of apartheid."
Constitutional Court stated that the state should have the
discretion to use its resources "imaginatively, wisely,
efficiently and equitably, to facilitate the reconstruction
process ... for the benefit of the entire nation.""
1.

The Victim's Right to Compensation

It is important to note that the term "reparations," as
used in the Act, is not used therein to mean "compensation"
(as it is generally understood to mean in other legal contexts).
Most of the "reparations" envisioned by the Act are instead
symbolic acts such as: the building of symbols and
monuments, measures to rehabilitate the community,
granting of medical benefits and social assistance, renaming
streets to reflect the struggle, and only a very limited amount
29. South Africa Press Agencies (SAPA), Nieuwoudt Shows No Remorse,
Mar. 29, 2004, at http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/2004/news0330.txt (last
visited Feb. 23, 2005).
30. See AZAPO, % 44-46.
31. Id. %43.
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of monetary grants were given-the approximately 22,000
victims received, in terms of U.S. dollars, just over $4,000
each. 2 These reparative acts, with or without the intervening
efforts of the TRC, are important for the legitimacy of the new
South African state. They are necessary in any revolutionary
context where there is a radical break from a previous order
to a new dispensation. Moreover, the social transformation
and uplifting of the historically disadvantaged is a form of
reparation that the majority of people expect.
However, when viewed from an international human
rights perspective, what is offered as "reparations" does not
constitute a sufficient and effective remedy for the victims of
apartheid. What these reparations offer is not necessarily
personalized to the individual victim, and in fact, the only
benefit to the victim at all is a confession from the perpetrator
of a gross human rights violation. Truth-telling is no tradeoff
for justice, or for true compensation ordered by a competent
tribunal. The observation has been made that "human rights
without effective implementation are shadows without
Almost all the seminal instruments of
substance."3
international human rights guarantee victims a right to an
actual and effective remedy before an impartial and
competent tribunal.3 4
32. Report of the Ad Hoc Joint Committee on Reparations, June 24, 2003.
With respect to monetary grants, payment of up to R 30,000.00 is earmarked for
22,000 victims of gross human rights violations (in terms of U.S. dollars,
at
per
victim),
$4,400
approximately
(lasted
www.pmg.org.za/docs2003/comreports/030625reparationsreport.htm
visited Apr. 11, 2005) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review); South African
Press Agencies (SAPA), Apartheid Victims Disrupt Healing Ceremony Held in
at
30,
2003,
Nov.
Honor,
Their
http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/2003/newsl20l.txt (last visited Apr. 11,
2005).
33. Richard B. Lillich, Global Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHT
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 134 (Theodor Meron ed.,

reprinted 1988) (quoting John P. Humphrey).
34. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is
widely accepted to embody norms of customary international law provides in
article 8 that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law." G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948), U.N. GAOR, adopted by the
General Assembly on Dec. 10, 1948. Article 2.3(a) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M 368 (1967),
provides that each state party undertakes "[t]o ensure that any person whose
rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
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For example, in 1985, the United Nations General
Assembly passed a resolution entitled the Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power that reiterates the right of the victim to seek
individual redress and compensation."
This authoritative
and widely accepted recognition of the right to an actual
remedy arguably elevates that right to at least a norm of
customary international law. Because the Amnesty Act fails
to provide an effective and individual remedy for victims in
South Africa, it cannot be viewed as complying with
international law.
2.

The Victim's Right to a Hearingbefore an
Independent and Impartial Tribunal

The Amnesty Act takes from the victim his or her
fundamental right of seeking redress from a court and
instead asks the victim to place his or her confidence in the
bureaucracy of the state.
The Amnesty Act does not
guarantee the victim any redress. Instead, whether any
redress is provided, as well as the kind of redress, is entirely
within the discretion of the Legislature and the Executive.36
The words "independent" and "impartial" are contained in
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Article,37 Section 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 8 Article 6(1) of the European Convention

acting in an official capacity."

Similar provisions are found in almost all the

regional human rights instruments. The American Convention on Human
Rights provides similar protections in article 25. O.A.S. OFFICIAL RECORDS
OEA/SER. K/XVII 1.1, Doc. 65, Rev.1 Corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1970)
and entered into force on July 18, 1978. The European Convention of Human
Rights contains a similar protection in article 13. European Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(1955). Similarly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in Article
7(1)(a) also contains the right to a remedy. OAU Doc. CABILEG67/3Rev. 5,
adopted by the Organization of African Unity on June 27, 1981 and entered into
force on Oct. 21, 1986, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm
(last visited May 14, 2005).

35. G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 96th plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34
(1985).
36. See

REP.

OF

S.

AFR. CONST.

(Constitution

Act,

1994)

http://www.polity.org.za/htmIgovdocs/legislation/1993/sacon93txt.html
visited Sept. 10, 2005).

§

27

(last

37. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GA Res. 217 (III 1948).

38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
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on Human Rights,39 and Article 8(1) of the American
Convention of Human Rights.4" The importance then, of
allowing victims of human rights violations to come before an
independent and impartial tribunal to seek redress is both
apparent and widely accepted. The ordinary meaning of
"independent" is independent of other organs of government.41
In his concurring opinion in the AZAPO case, Justice John
Didcott stated that the Committee on Amnesty and the
Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation appear to be
But this finding is not
independent and impartial. 42
consistent with international human rights interpretations,
because the ordinary meaning of "independent" is
independent of other organs of government in terms of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The TRC should only serve to complement the work of a
Since the TRC lacks any
competent judicial tribunal.
enforcement capability, it cannot force the victim to accept it
as a complete substitute for a legal tribunal. Archbishop
Desmond Tutu (the Chair of the TRC) who, much to the
chagrin of the South African government, recently recognized
this problem and lent his support to the civil action brought
against major American corporations, such as Citigroup, JP
Morgan Chase, IBM, and Daimler Chrysler, for benefiting
from apartheid.' Apartheid victims brought the action before
the United States courts in hopes of finding a tribunal that
would grant it proper redress."
In a written statement to the New York District Court,
Archbishop Tutu declared that any compensation awarded by
the American courts would not be incompatible with the TRC
The
nor undermine reconciliation in South Africa.
Archbishop stated, "to the contrary, the obtaining of
39. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 213 UNTS 221, and entered into force on Sept.
3, 1953.
40. American Convention on Human Rights, OAS OFFICIAL RECORDS
OEA/SER. K/XVI/ 1.1, Doc. 65, Rev.1 Corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1970)
and entered into force on July 18, 1978.
41. Lillich, supra note 33, at 141.
42. AZAPO, 53.
43. South African Press Agencies (SAPA), Government Dismissive of Tutu's
at
1, 2004),
York
Apartheid Case, (Feb.
Support for New
http://www.anc.org/za/anc/newsbrief/2004/newsO2O2.text (last visited Feb. 23,
2005).
44. Id.
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compensation for victims of apartheid [would] supplement the
very modest amount per victim to be awarded as reparation
under the TRC process [and] could promote reconciliation.' 5
The South African government viewed the action with scorn,
focusing instead on the potential risks that the country could
suffer from an investment and job-creation perspective. 6
Arguably, the South African government saw the TRC as
important in engendering confidence in the South African
economy as committed to the free market system.4 7
C. The InternationalLaw Obligationto Prosecute
The TRC has attempted to undertake the important goal
of promoting a national dialogue where responsibility for
harm is identified and addressed. But there are just as many
victims who feel that substantive results, like accountability
and justice for gross human rights violations, are equally as
important. The gross human rights violations committed
under apartheid include: conventional war crimes- (violations
of the laws of war), and the two additional categories of
crimes recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal (crimes against
peace and crimes against humanity). 8 By extension, gross
human rights violations also include genocide, apartheid, and
the systematic use of torture.4 9 These crimes, and their
prohibition, are widely considered to be peremptory norms of
international law from which there can be no derogation,
even in times of emergency.
There are a number of sociological and political factors
that prompted the adoption of the Amnesty Act.50
But
regardless of sociological and political judgments that
45. Id.
46. Id. (statement of Presidential spokesman Bheki Khumalo).
47. See Boraine & Breytenbach, supra note 24, at 12 (views of Breyton
Breytenbach).
48. Article 6 of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of ithe European Axis Powers and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, signed and in force Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279, [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
49. Edward M. Wise, Perspectives and Approaches,. in 1 INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL LAW 106 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
50. For an overview of the sociological and political factors that often come
into play in questions of punishment and amnesty in South Africa (and in other
nascent democracies) see Lynn Berat & Yossi Shain, Retribution of TruthTelling in South Africa? Legacies of the Transitional Phase, 20 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 163 (1995).
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political actors make, international law imposes an obligation
on states to prosecute individuals who are alleged to have
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. 1 This
obligation is a higher norm of international law that cannot
be compromised to political expediency. The Amnesty Act, to
the extent that it provides for amnesty for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, violates a cardinal rule of
international humanitarian law, namely that there can be no
amnesty for such deeds.52 Similarly, the Act, in suspending
and canceling any civil action that victims of war crimes may
bring against alleged offenders, violates a superior norm of
international law that provides rights to individual victims
regardless of the attitude of the state. 3 There are similar
obligatory duties, under international law, that mandate the
prosecution of individuals alleged to be involved in crimes
against humanity, and crimes against peace.'
1.

Apartheid as War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity

The Nuremberg Charter defines crimes against humanity
as conduct against civilian populations such as murder,
extermination, deportation, and persecution on religious,
racial or political grounds before or during the war."
Subsequent developments in international law confirm that
crimes against humanity can occur both in the course of war,
as well as in peacetime against the state's own domestic
population.56 International law now characterizes apartheid

51. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2549 (1991).
52. The Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, in force Oct. 21, 1950, 75
U.N.T.S. 75, 85, 135, 287 (1950), hereinafter referred to as either the First,
Second, Third, or Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. See Article 49 of the First
Geneva Convention, Article 50 of the Second Geneva Convention, Article 129 of
the Third Geneva Convention, and Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, all of which impose an obligatory duty to prosecute for war crimes.
53. With respect to war crimes, see Article 49 of the First Geneva
Convention of 1949, Article 50 of the Second Geneva Convention of 1949, Article
129 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, and Article 146 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949.
54. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 500-06 (1992).

55. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 48, at art. 6(c).
56. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Development and Future Prospects, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 89-90 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
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as a crime against humanity,5 7 and victims of apartheid are
therefore entitled to all the international law remedies
afforded to victims of crimes against humanity.
The U.N. General Assembly codified apartheid as a crime
against humanity in 1973, when it adopted the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid.5 8 The Apartheid Convention also characterizes
apartheid as a crime against humanity.59 The Preamble to
the Apartheid Convention states that certain attributes of
apartheid constitute genocide.
But what exactly is
"apartheid?"
The Convention applies the term to a host of acts
including denying members of a particular racial group the
right to life and liberty. 0 Apartheid also includes murder of
members of a racial group; infliction of serious bodily or
mental harm upon members of a racial group (including
torture or cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment); and, the
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment of members of a racial
group.6
The crime of apartheid also encompasses the
deliberate imposition on a racial group of living conditions
calculated to cause their full or partial physical destruction;62
legislative measures preventing them from participating fully
in the political system or from enjoying their full human
rights;63 measures designed to divide the population along
racial lines by the creation of separate reserves or ghettos;'
exploitation of labor and forced labor;65 and, persecution of
individuals and organizations "by depriving them of their
57. See Article 3 of Security Council Resolution 392 of June 19, 1976, S.C.
Res. 392, U.N. SCOR, 1930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/392 (1976). See also
Article 3 of Security Council Resolution 473 of June 13, 1980, S.C. Res. 473,
U.N. SCOR, 2231st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/473 (1980). For the characterization
of apartheid as a crime against humanity, see Article 1 of Security Council
Resolution 556 of 1984 as adopted on Dec. 13, 1984. S.C. Res. 556, U.N. SCOR,
2560th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/556 (1984).
58. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, GA Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. (No.
30) at 75, U.N. Doc A/9030 of Nov. 30, 1973, in force July 18, 1976 [hereinafter
Apartheid Convention].
59. See id. at art. I(1).
60. Id. at art. II.
61. Id. at art. 11(a).
62. Id. at art. II(b).
63. Id. at art. 1I(d).
64. Apartheid Convention, supra note 58, at art. II(d).
65. Id. at art. II(e).
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fundamental rights and freedoms because they oppose
66
apartheid."
For persons who engage in the above-mentioned acts, the
Convention attaches individual and collective responsibility."
The Convention further imposes an obligation on state
parties to bring to trial, and punish, individuals responsible
for acts defined as the crime of apartheid. 8 The Convention
also provides for universal jurisdiction, allowing the courts of
any state party who may acquire personal jurisdiction over
the individual to try the individual who engaged in acts of
apartheid.6 9 The Convention specifically mentions a duty not
Overall, the
to apply the political offense exception."
are
similar to
Convention
provisions in the Apartheid
declarations made by the governments and statesmen of the
Allied Powers during World War II in that each warned
criminals that their terrible crimes would not go
unpunished.' To allow a different result would not reflect the
fact that apartheid is an internationally recognized crime
against humanity.
Given that apartheid is an international crime, there is
an obligation on all states, whether party to the Apartheid
Convention or not, to prosecute and punish such conduct. In
other words, the obligation to punish crimes against
international law, particularly crimes against humanity, is an
obligation erga omnes."7 This obligation therefore binds South
Africa even if it is not a party to the Apartheid Convention.
By 1985, there were already over eighty countries that had
signed on as parties to the Apartheid Convention, and it is
reasonable to argue that the new South African government
had a separate duty to prosecute alleged apartheid
66. Id. at art. 11(f).
67. Id. at art. III.
68. Id. at art. IV(b).
69. Id. at art. V.
70. Apartheid Convention, supra note 58, at art. XI. The political offense
exception is embodied in the Castioni Principle, which requires that for a
criminal act to be political and non-extraditable, the crime must have been
committed with a political motive and in the course of a political disturbance.
Wortley, supra note 3, at 227-28.
71. See Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 40 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).

72. An erga omnes obligation is an obligation owed by a state to the entire
international community.

ed. 2003).

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 116 (5th
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"criminals" under what has now become customary
international law.7"
Significantly, the United Nations
General Assembly attempted to limit the potential for
individuals to escape prosecution for war crimes and crimes
against humanity by adopting the Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity. 4 That Convention specifies that
no statutes of limitation shall apply to crimes against
humanity, and mentions apartheid and genocide by name."
2. Jus Cogens and the Obligationto Prosecute
This conclusion is further reflected in the fact that the
punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity has
risen to the status ofjus cogens. When an international norm
reaches the status of jus cogens, all states are bound to
refrain from any actions that are prohibited by that
peremptory norm. Thus, any action on the part of a state
that infringes on, or otherwise conflicts with, that peremptory
norm is null and void.76 Jus cogens norms are "foundational,
guarding the most fundamental and highly-valued interests
of international society."77 Jus cogens has been equated with
the concept of natural law, and the idea of "necessary" law
that all states are compelled to observe. 8 This concept
invalidates state-made
rules that conflict with its
application.7 9 It does not matter whether the state's act
comes as a result of a purported agreement with another
state(s), or if it is a unilateral action. In either case, if the

73. See Roger S. Clark, The Crime of Apartheid, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 312 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
Clark argues that
regardless of what the views of South Africa and other countries may have been

at the time of the Apartheid Convention's conception, the Convention has so
many parties that it must be regarded that this in itself has an impact on
contemporary international law. Id. at 317.
74. GA Res. 2391 (XXIII), U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess; Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968) and entered into force on Nov. 11, 1970.

75. Id. at art. 1(b).
76. See Takeshi Minagawa, Jus Cogens in Public International Law, 6
HITOTSUBASHI J. INT'L L. & POL. 16, 25 (1968).
77. See Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests
Fundamentalto InternationalSociety, 28 VA. J. INTL L. 585, 587 (1988).
78. Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 361
(1988).
79. Id. at 359.
See also THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAw 220 (1989).
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action conflicts with ajus cogens norm, the action is invalid."
For example, crimes against humanity, like apartheid,
must be punished under international law. This duty to
punish, which has risen to the level of jus cogens, creates an
exception to national sovereignty, the cardinal principle of
Whereas a state generally has
international law. 81
sovereignty in deciding whom to punish, and for what, where
a crime against humanity has been committed, that
sovereignty must yield to international law obligations. A
state cannot avoid this international law obligation to
prosecute, even in order to achieve national reconciliation.82
Under this rule, the South African government absolutely
cannot provide amnesty to alleged apartheid "criminals" for
crimes against humanity.
International criminal law seeks to punish any person
who commits an act that is a crime under international law.
This principle is derived from the Charter and judgment of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, and has since been affirmed by the
The Nuremberg
United Nations General Assembly.8 3
Tribunal noted that international law imposes duties upon
both individuals and states. The Tribunal noted further that
international law crimes "are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provision[s] of international law
be enforced."' Several international conventions, namely the
four Geneva Conventions, codified these principles espoused
The Geneva Conventions
by the Nuremberg Tribunal.
operate on the assumption that each state will enforce the
provisions of the treaties in terms of its domestic criminal
law, and will cooperate in the prosecution, and punishment of
individuals engaged in international crime. 5 The objective is
not vengeance, but rather through prosecution and
punishment, to achieve deterrence.8 6
80. Meron, supra note 79, at 220-22.
81. Orentlicher, supra note 51, at 2593.
82. Id. at 2595.
83. Bierzanek, supra note 71, at 44.
84. Judicial Decisions International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg)
Judgment and Sentences, 41 AJIL 172, 221 (1947).
85. See M.Cherif Bassiouni, Characteristicsof InternationalCriminal Law
Conventions, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,

1986).
86. Id. See also Orentlicher, supra note 51, at 2542.
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IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE AMNESTY ACT AND THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS

The Geneva Conventions are also significant in that they
expressly classify "armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self
determination" as "international" conflicts for the purpose of
applying the laws of war.87 Viewing apartheid and acts
related to colonial rule as being "international" conflicts, as
the United Nations does, is logical in light of the reality that
the struggle for self-determination is on its own a legitimate
struggle in international law.'
Because apartheid is an
international conflict for these purposes, its perpetrators are
subject to punishment for "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Convention. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions specifies
the types of conduct that may constitute a grave breach, and
perhaps the most pertinent to the present discussion are
"practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading
practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on
racial discrimination."89 Most significantly, the next sub-part
states that grave breaches shall be regarded as war crimes.' °
The Geneva Convention Protocol I also lists population
transfers and practices of apartheid and other discriminating
or degrading practices as a grave breach.9 Additionally,
Protocol I states that the "provisions of the Conventions
relating to the repression of breaches and grave breaches ...
shall apply to the repression of breaches and grave breaches
of this Protocol."92 This imposes an obligation on state parties
not only to punish for war crimes, but also to punish for
apartheid specifically as a grave breach of the Convention.
This is further emphasized in the next Article which
provides that state parties shall "take measures necessary to
suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this
Protocol."93 The obligation to punish for a grave breach is jus
87. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 as
adopted June 8, 1977, in force Dec. 7, 1978. Art. 1(4) of Protocol I.
88. HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 128-29, 151 (1990).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, art. 85(4)(c).
Id. at art. 85(5).
Id. at arts. 85(3), 85(4).
Id. at art. 85(1).
Id. at art. 86(1).
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cogens. Apart from the individual victims in South Africa, the
actors in the apartheid state are also liable for any war
crimes and crimes against humanity94 committed against
civilian and lawful combatants from the neighboring African
countries. The Geneva Convention mandates respect for
civilian populations." Similarly, the rights of these victims
cannot be waived by any government and thus, any attempt
in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act to
suppress the prosecution and penalization of the perpetrators
of such actions violates jus cogens norms. It is debatable
whether Protocol I, in its entirety, reflects principles of
customary international law.96 But it is arguably accurate to
say that, at a minimum, the grave breaches identified in the
main provisions of Protocol I reflect customary international
law if not jus cogens.97
The Amnesty Act, in so far as it provides amnesty for war
crimes, is inconsistent with this international law obligation
to exercise compulsory prosecution when there is an
allegation of war crimes. A war crime is not a "common"
criminal offense, and someone alleged to be involved in war
crimes cannot receive amnesty simply by claiming that the
crime was of a "political nature."9 As discussed above, the
Geneva Conventions codify the duty to prosecute when war
crimes are committed, and they mandate states to provide
effective criminal sanctions for breaches of the Conventions."
In other words, there is an obligation on contracting states to
prosecute and punish the grave violations mentioned in the
Conventions. Under the Conventions, parties are obligated
to: 1) search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
been involved in any way with a grave breach of the
Conventions; and 2) to prosecute and punish them before

94. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, art. 86(2).
95. See Fourth Geneva Convention arts. 27, 32. See also JEAN PICTET, THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 33-34, 46-47 (1966), for the
essence and rationale of making the individual the beneficiary of the right.
96. See MERON, supra note 79, at 62-70.
97. Id. at 67, 85. See generally Gay J. McDougall & Carl E.S. Soderbergh,
The Release of South Africa's PoliticalPrisoners:Definitionsand Expectations, 4
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1990).
98. See Wortley, supra note 3.
99. See Article 49 of the First Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 50 of the
Second Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949, and Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
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their own courts." This obligation is a peremptory norm of
international law. 1 ' But not only is the South African state
bound to search and prosecute such criminals, it also cannot
waive prosecution or otherwise forgive the incident. If a state
purports to do so, it is in violation of international law, and
this violation on the part of the state does not foreclose the
right of the victim to seek redress elsewhere.
As alluded to above, there is a duality of rights granted
simultaneously to the individual and the state in which the
individual is a subject. The lawful combatant and the civilian
stand on their own rights without having to depend on the
goodwill of the state to protect those rights for them.
Likewise, the state of nationality can take an action on its
own without waiting for the victim to first appeal to it for
help.0 2
The Amnesty Act violates international law in
attempting to suspend all civil actions, and in doing so, it
prevents victims from seeking redress against the
perpetrator(s) of apartheid-related crimes. The right of the
victim to seek redress is a peremptory norm from which there
can be no derogation. So while the failure of the South
African government to prosecute individuals accused of
violations of the Geneva Conventions violates a peremptory
norm of international law, the fact that the state is prepared
to forget does not bind the victim.0 3 Neither the state nor the
individual can waive the other's right. Each of the four
Geneva Conventions provide: "No High Contracting Party
shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High
Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by any
other High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred
to in the preceding Article.""° This is also a peremptory norm
100. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 563 (4th ed.

1990).

101. See Karen Parker & Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of
Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 455-56 (1989).

102. Common Articles 7 in the First, Second, and Third Geneva Convention,
and Article 8 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provide that "[pirotected person
may in no circumstances renounce" the rights secured to them in the
Conventions. See also Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict, in 2
HUMAN

RIGHTS IN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

LEGAL AND

POLICY ISSUES

355

(Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
103. Dinstein, supra note 102.
104. See Article 51 of the First Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 52 of the
Second Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 131 of the Third Geneva Convention
of 1949, and Article 148 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
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of international law." 5 The requirement to prosecute the
perpetrator, and the right of the victim to seek redress
against the perpetrator, are peremptory norms of
international law, and as a result, invalidate any provision in
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act to the
contrary.
V.

CONCLUSION

There has not been a ground swell of opposition to the
TRC. Much can be attributed to the legitimacy of the
towering personalities who led the process namely former
President Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
Mandela engenders trust and confidence like no other figure,
and to many, the TRC is viewed as the creation of Mandela.
The renowned South African author Breyton Bretenbach
remarked that the TRC was "probably intended to let off
steam." 6 Breytenbach questions whether it has done any
good. 0 7

Zimbabwe,

after

the

1979

Lancaster

House

Agreements, also adopted a forgive-and-forget attitude. Like
South Africa, they adopted a government of national unity
with reserved number of seats for the white minority and
with members of the previous regime serving in the first
government of national unity. For a long time, they had an
immensely popular president, Robert Mugabe. Today, the
country is in near civil war, a primary source of which has
been Robert Mugabe himself, no doubt because of his own
self-serving needs and actions. Trevor Manuel, the South
African Minister of Finance, remarked in a speech on March
2, 2004 that the patience of the poor should not be taken for
granted and as "long as poverty remains at its current levels,
it will test our democracy."0 8 Big businesses, the mines, and
farmers profited under apartheid and were able to reap
supernatural profits under the discriminatory laws, pass
system, denial of worker rights, and low wages. These sectors
have not taken responsibility for this. Those that historically
105. Parker & Neylon, supra note 101, at 455-56.
106. Boraine & Breytenbach, supra note 24, at 12.
107. Id. at 15.
108. South African Press Agencies (SAPA), Don't Take Patience of Poor for
2004),
at
Granted:
Manuel,
(Mar.
3,
http://www.anc.org.za/ancnewsbrief/2004news03O4.txt. (last visited Apr. 2,

2005).
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benefited through the color of their skin still control the
natural resources, property, and wealth. At some stage, the
question is likely to be posed-what does the Constitution
and the Truth and Reconciliation Act mean to the ordinary
South African?
Does it serve as an instrument and
framework for fulfilling their critical needs such as food,
education, medical care, housing, and the like? As to whether
the TRC has made an enduring contribution to national unity
and reconciliation, I suspect the jury will be out on this
question for some time.

